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THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE COMMON LAW.
FIRST ARTICLE.
A proper examination of the extent to which the principles
governing the decisions, and regulating the practice of those tri-
bunals of our municipal law known as Courts of .Equity, or
Ohancery, have been introduced, received and adopted as modifica-
tions, additions and improvements of the system of justice adminis-
tered in that more ancient and more extensive division of the juris-
prudence of England and the United States, -designated as the
common law, would lead to a survey and consideration of most of
the prominent doctrines and rules appertaining to each of the
three general heads of equity jurisdiction, the concurrent, the
exclusive, and the ancillary. It would be necessary to consider
the doctrines of that part of its jurisdiction which is concurrent
with the exercise of similar powers on the part of courts of law,
because many of these equitable principles and rules, for the sake
of their greater convenience, simplicity and justice, have been
adopted by courts of law, in order to effect more completely objects
which they could previously obtain only partially and imperfectly.
It would be of importance to examine the principles and pre-
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cepts controlling the exercise of the jurisdiction which courts of
equity have at any time possessed exclusively, since in many in-
stances it would be found that courts of law have endeavored to
exercise a similar jurisdiction, and to give remedies which they
never before afforded, adopting in so doing the doctrines and rules
of the tribunals which they imitated.
And it would also be necessary to consider the modes of pro-
ceeding adopted by courts of equity, for the purpose of aiding and
assisting the administration of justice in courts of law, since it
might appear that legal tribunals have been able to furnish to their
suitors, in many cases previously requiring this foreign assistance,
the whole relief desired ; and to dispense with a resort to the ancil-
lary jurisdiction of another tribunal.
Such an examination of the body of chancery law, together with
a careful comparison of every part thereof, with the corresponding
principles of the common law in relation to the same subject mat-
ters, would result in an exposition of the real difference between
those principles, would also bring to view all their resemblances,
and be the means of disclosing many interchanges of rules and doc-
trines, more .especially displaying the great extent to which the
mild and liberal principles of equity have pervaded the administra-
tion of common law, varying from a complete usurpation of power
over many subject matters of jurisdiction, down to the slightest and
almost imperceptible shades of influence over methods and manners
of reasoning and practice.
So thorough and exhaustive an examination and exposition of
the interchanging relations which the principles of equity and law
have borne to each other, is not, however, within the limits of a
treatise like the present. Our prescribed object will be, perhaps,
fully attained if we are able to seize upon the more prominent in-
stances of the reception and adoption of the peculiar principles of
equity, into the practice of the tribunals of the law, and to present
to view some of the most obvious and most extended effects which
the introduction of those principles has produced, leaving a more
complete examination, and the detection of less evident influences
and closer analogies, to a more extensive treatise.
IN THE COMMON LAW.
MORTGAGE.-IPerhaps the most striking instance of the intro-
duction of purely equitable principles into the administration of the
common law, is to be found in viewing the law in relation to mort-
gages of real property, as it exists at the present day, and com-
paring it with the condition of the law as it existed at and before
the time of Lord Coke.
At their first inception, mortgages were in fact what they now
are in form, actual conveyances of the whole legal estate, with a
condition that the feoffments should become void upon the payment
of a certain sum of money, or the performance of some agreement
at a time specified, which condition being performed, the estate re-
vested in its former owner.1 If the condition was not literally com-
plied with, according to the strict rules of law by which the con-
struction of all conditions that were to defeat or divest estates was
governed, the ownership became complete in the mortgagee, and was
absolutely and forever gone from the mortgagor.
2
To such an extent was this strictness of construction carried, that
in a case where a mortgagee's representatives consented to receive
less than the sum due, in satisfaction of the mortgage, and it was
agreed "that yet in appearance for the better performance of the
condition the whole sum should be paid," and that the residue above
the amount of the debt, as agreed to be reduced, should be repaid,
which agreement was performed, and the representatives of the
mortgagor entered upon the land, which in the meantime had been
transferred from the mortgagee, by divers mesne conveyances, to a
third person; yet it was held by the whole court of King's Bench,
affirmed on a writ of error in the Exchequer, and therefore decided
by all the judges of England, that this "was not any performance
of the condition, because an estate of inheritance was, by the pay-
ment of the said money, to be divested, and therefore the condition
should be performed by a true and effectual payment, and not by a
shadow or color of payment." s And it would appear, that if the
condition was not performed at the day and in the manner pre-
scribed, no subsequent performance, although accepted and its
' 2 Gr. Cruise, 65, 3, 4, 5. * Ibid.
3 Goodall's Case, 5 Coke, 95.
515
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
l:enefit received by the mortgagee, could divest the estate, which,
Laving now become an absolute fee simple in the mortgagee, could
not be reconveyed, except by the same ceremonies necessary to an
original feoffment.'
This strictness, although perhaps warranted by the terms of the
instruments and the condition of the common law at that day, yet,
being entirely contrary to the real intent of the parties to such en-
gagements, and not in accordance with any true principle of justice)
was, as may be supposed, regarded with any thing but favor by all
who were not blinded by professional prejudice, or a devout attach-
ment to form and precedent, but were able to perceive the true na-
ture and meaning of the contract, and that every conveyance of
this nature was intended but for a security, whose operation was
sufficient when that object was fully and completely accomplished,
without the necessity of an inevitable forfeiture upon the slightest
failure of the exact performance of the condition.
2
Lands mortgaged being thus evidently intended only as security
for the money borrowed, or for the performance of the conditions
stated, the absolute loss of the estate, upon a failure to perform in
the manner indicated, came soon to be considered as in the nature
of a forfeiture, against which courts of chancery had already taken
jurisdicion to relieve, and the principle was accordingly adopted in
equity, that although upon the non-performance of the condition,
the estate became absolute at law in the mortgagee, yet that the
mortgagor should still be entitled to a right to redeem his estate by
payment of the money with interests and costs, or the performance
of the condition and payment of damages, if this right were exer-
3 2 Gr. Cruise, 65, 6; Wade's Case, 5 Coke, 114.
2 As illustrating the odium with which persons outside of the legal profession
'were accustomed to regard such strict forfeitures of lands mortgaged, Shakspeare's
play of the Merchant of Venice may be referred to, and also the following passage
from Beaumont and Pletcher:
Alathe.-Thou hast undone a faithful gentleman
By taking forfeit of his land.
Algripe.-I do confess, I will henceforth practice repentance.
I will restore all mortgages, forswear abominable usury.
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cised within a reasonable time.' This method of proceeding could
be no injury to the creditor, since he would be most amply secured,
and it effectuated completely the actual and full intent of the par-
ties. In accordance with this principle, courts of equity enter-
tained bills for relief and the redemption of mortgages, after the
forfeiture had accrued ; and upon the satisfaction, or offer of satis-
faction by the mortgagor, would decree a redemption, and the exe-
cution of all releases and conveyances necessary for the confirma-
tion and reconveyance of the legal estate to the mortgagor on those
entitled under him.2
The full and complete operation of this principle was not esta-
blished even in equity without some difficulty and delay; and al-
though, in cases arising between the parties to the mortgage, the
conveyance was treated simply as a security, yet for a time the
legal titles acquired upon a forfeiture by other persons, such as a
right of dower in the wife of the mortgagee, or the title of the
king or other lord of the fee, in case of the.death of the mortgagee
without heirs, or his commission of acts creating a forfeiture of his
lands and goods, could not be disturbed.3  The increasing power of
courts of equity, however, soon enabled them to put their equitable
principle in relation to mortgages into the fullest operation,4 in
which utmost vigor it has always continued the pole-star of equity
jurisdiction which has ever guided, directed, and controlled its doc-
trines, practices, and remedies, being the principle that a mortgage
is but a security for the debt, to be allowed by no-possibility to ope-
rate in any other way or to any greater extent.5
It is very evident that the difference thus arising between the
construction adopted by courts of law and that of courts of equity,
in relation to mortgages, the former treating them, as we have
12 Gr. Cruise, 66, 8.
2 Emanuel College vs. Evans, 1 Chancery Reports, 11 ; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4,
5, and 1; 1 FonbI. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, 13; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 1013-14; Seton vs.
Slade, 7 Vesey, 274.
3 Bac. Abr., Mortgage, and Butler's note to Co. Litt. 204 b.
4 2 Gr. Cruise, 67, 10.
5 2 Gr. Cruise, 67, 14, and note; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 1016.
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already seen, precisely as conveyances upon condition, to which the
incidents of estates upon condition were to be strictly annexed,
while the latter courts regarded them according to their true
intent, as mere securities; must have led to a considerable degree
of antagonism between the two jurisdictions, and been productive
of the greatest inconveniences. If courts of law upon the non-
performance of the condition of a mortgage, considered the property
as absolutely in the mortgagee in fee simple, and thereupon allowed
it to be taken in execution for his debts, to be subject to the dower
of his wife, and made it liable to be forfeited upon the commission
of felonies by him, and to escheat to the lord of the fee, upon his
death without heirs; and if these courts refused to listen to any
suggestions of equitable principles of relief, to prevent such occur-
rences; it is obvious that courts of equity would be continually
employed in relieving against rules of law, and decreeing the exe-
cution of instruments and conveyances necessary to carry out and
establish their own principles and doctrines, in such a manner that
in accordance therewith legal estates might be created, which must
be recognized by courts of common law.
The refusal on the part of legal tribunals to recognize the estab-
lished principles of equity in relation to mortgages, did not exist
(as in many instances very properly might have been, and now is
the case,) because those principles were such as could only be
adopted by courts having powers of enforcing them, similar to
those possessed only by equity tribunals, which powers not being
within the exercise of courts of law, compelled them to ignore and
reject all the equitable estates and interests created by the Court
of Chancery, upon the principle that the law recognizes no right to
which it cannot apply a remedy. It was rather because the terms
and forms of the conveyances in mortgage had a defined legal
meaning and effect, which prevented the minds of common law
judges and lawyers, from looking through the technical construc-
tion of the conveyance, and kept them from perceiving and declar-
ing that though in form a feoffment upon condition it was really
and truly but a security for money due, or for a contract to be
performed.
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As is generally the case, however, when there is an opposition
of technical rules and reasons to the exercise of evident principles
of natural and municipal justice, courts of law were before long
compelled, partly by statute and partly by the natural extent and
pervading power of the doctrines maintained in equity, to depart
somewhat from their ancient and established rules and construc-
tions, and permit the introduction into the common law administra-
tion of justice, of principles which had long been propounded and
adopted in courts of equity, and which could not long remain con-
fined solely to one of these two great jurisdictions, exercising nearly
equal powers, in a great degree commingling with each other, and
governing and determining the whole rights of property of the same
nation. The introduction of these equitable principles into the
law, from its commencement to the present moment has been gra-
dually and surely increasing in extent, until the case of mortgages
has come to be considered emphatically " one of the most splendid
instances in the history of our jurisprudence of the triumph of
equitable principles over technical rules, and of the homage which
those principles have received by their adoption in the courts of
law."' The progress and extent of this change it is our province
briefly to examine.
The effect of the rigorous doctrines of the courts of common law
in considering mortgages as estates upon condition, was to withdraw
actions upon such contracts almost entirely from the jurisdiction of
those courts, except when resorted to by mortgagees for the pur-
pose of procuring those advantages which could not be obtained in
courts of equity, since those courts on the contrary would interfere
to prevent the proceedings instituted at law. The jurisdiction of
equity over the subject of mortgages became therefore almost as
exclusive as in cases of trusts, and in this condition the law of
mortgages remained for a considerable period, courts of law recog-
nizing no such peculiar conveyances as deeds of mortgage, distin-
guished from estates upon condition liable to be divested upon a
strict performance of the conditions upon which the estates were to
1 4 Kent's Com. Lect. 68.
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terminate, and subject to be defeated in no other way while courts
of equity continued to increase and strengthen their jurisdiction,
and to establish and construct, a well defined system of rules for
the determination of all the various questions arising concerning
mortgaged estates, in accordance with their peculiar principle that
a mortgage although a security of a peculiar nature, is no more
than a security.
About the year 1734 the inconveniences arising from the exist-
ence of different doctrines, and systems of rules in the different
jurisdictions, became so burdensome, that in that year, the seventh
of the reign of aeorge the Second, an act of Parliament was
passed,' providing that whenever actions were brought upon mort-
gages, if any persons who were, or might appear and become de-
fendants to such suit, should at any time pending such action pay
to the mortgagee or his representatives, or in case of their refusal
to accept, should bring into court, the principal moneys due upon
the mortgage, with interest thereon, and such costs as the court
might determine, such moneys should be deemed and taken to be in
full satisfaction and discharge of the mortgage, and by rules of
court the mortgagees should be compelled to assign and reconvey
the lands and property mortgaged, and deliver up all title deeds in
their custody relating to such lands. This act, in its terms, applies
to all actions brought upon mortgages, before or after the breach of
the condition, although referring in the preamble to actions brought
for the purpose of foreclosure. Its effect being to stay proceedings
at law, and give in a majority of cases as effectual relief as could be
afforded in equity; this change of the law, a statute introduction of
equity principles, rather than their gradual encroachment on ac-
count of their adaptation to the demands of justice, seems to have
been the first manifestion of an entrance through which the purer
and more just doctrines of equity upon this subject, were eventually
to pass to such a great extent into the administration of the com-
mon law; although in this, as in most cases where a gradual change
has been effected in principles of the law relating to real property,
I Statutes at Large, 7 Geo. 2, ch. 20.
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the actual commencement of the movement is obscure and not to be
exactly determined. It was natural that the power given by this
statute to courts of law, to exercise in an effectual manner much of
the jurisdiction which courts of equity previously exclusively pos-
sessed, should become a starting point for the progressive, gradual
and easy introduction of many of the prominent principles of
equity, connected with and dependent upon the exercise of the
power thus conferred. We find courts and judges very soon begin-
ning to hold language concerning mortgages, such as had previously
been unknown in any other than equity tribunals; asserting "that
a mortgage, notwithstanding the form, was but a chattel, and the
mortgage is only security, and it is an affront to common sense to
say the mortgagor is not the real owner ;" 1 and also affirming that
"although a mortgage is in form a conveyance of the legal estate,
yet neither courts of law or equity lose sight of what the parties
intended." 2
The extent to which the principles thus hinted at by courts of
law, as above stated, that, except so far as the relative rights of the
parties to the conveyance are concerned, and in relation to all
strangers and third parties, until the entry of the mortgagee for
breach of the condition, and in many respects until final absolute
foreclosure, the mortgagor is to all intents and purposes the owner
of the land, subject merely to the lien of the mortgagee, has been
established among the fundamentals of the common law in relation
to mortgages, may be ascertained to the best practical advantage by
a consideration of the present state of the law in America, where
the progress of equitable principles in pervading every department
of jurisprudence, has outstripped that of England, whose courts
have, not apparently, advanced beyond a recognition of those prin-
ciples which were absolutely necessary to the proper enforcement of
the statute of George the Second." 3
Per Lord Mansfield, J., Douglas, 631.
King vs. Inhabitants of Eddington, 1 East, 288.
3 Dixon vs. Wigram, 2 Cromp. & Jer., 613; Smeeton vs. Collier, 5 Dowl. &
Lowndes, 184.
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A mortgage then, in form, is a conveyance of the legal estate to
the mortgagee, and if he chooses to exercise the right, and there is
no agreement to the contrary, he may immediately enter and take
possession of the land.' But if there be an express contract that
until default the mortgagor shall remain in possession, the mort-
gagee cannot enter before default, and if he does, the mortgagor
can maintain trespass against him.2  And in the absence of any
express contract to this effect, it has been suggested that such an
agreement might be implied from the fact of the mortgagor being
permitted, for a length of time, to remain in possession of the pre-
mises.
3
Before any such entry, or an equivalent assertion of his title on
the part of the mortgagee.in some other mode, his interest under
the mortgage does not constitute any estate in the land. He has
no interest which can be taken by his creditors 4 nor any title to
the rents or profits,' nor any interest in the land which he can con-
vey without an assignment of the debt secured by the mortgage ;6
nor will an assignment of the mortgage deed, without a transfer of
the debt, convey anything. The land will not pass by the mort-
gagee's will of real estate, nor will his widow be entitled to dower
therein, unless the mortgage is fully foreclosed.7  Upon the death
of the mortgagee, the interest in the mortgage descends, not to his
heirs, but to his personal representatives, who may maintain a writ
of entry in their own names, to recover the land ; and a payment of
the money to the heirs, will not be an effectual payment to dis-
chaige the mortgage.8
On the other hand, the mortgagor is regarded as having a fee
I Reed vs. Davis, 4 Pick. 46; 4 Kent, 164.
2 Runyan vs. Mesereau, 11 Johns. 534.
3 Stowell vs. Pike, 2 Greenl. 387; Hartshorne vs. Hubbard, 2 N. H. 453: Jackson
vs. Hopkins, 18 Johns. 488.
4 Kelley vs. Burnham, 9 N. H. 20. s 4 Kknt, 155.
'. Aymer vs. Bill, 5 Johns. C. R. 570.
Ballard vs. Carter, 5 Pick. 112; Duke of Leeds vs. Munday, 3 Vcs. 3 .48.
sSmith vs. Dyer, 16 Mass.; Scott vs. McFarland, 13 Mass. 309; Runyan vs.
Mesereau, 11 Johns, 534.
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simple in the land; his estate is liable to seizure and a total sale
upon execution, subject, of course, to the payment of the debt
secured by the mortgage ; he is entitled to the rents and profits,
and takes them in his own right, and can convey the land, but not
without a deed, since his interest is an estate in the property.' His
interest is real estate within the meaning of statutes providing
modes in which settlements and citizenship may be obtained in
towns and cities ;2 it may be devised by him; upon his death it
descends to his heirs,3 and his widow is entitled to dower therein.
4
And as further evidence that the mortgagee's right, until as-
serted by entry or action, is but a chattel, and not an estate in the
land, it appears that when a mortgagee transfers his interest in the
debt secured by the mortgage, to another person, he ceases to have
any control over the mortgage ;5 the assignment of the debt carries
with it the mortgage, so as to enable the assignee to maintain an
action in equity, and in most cases at law, in his own name, upon
the mortgage ;6 and if a person having an interest to protect, pays
the money due upon the mortgage debt, he becomes in equity and
upon the weight of authority, in law also, the assignee of the mort-
gage, and entitled to the benefit of it until the debt is repaid him,
although the mortgage is in form cancelled or discharged, the trans-
action, in order to effect the substantial justice of the case, being
considered as a discharge or assignment of the mortgage, as the
interest of the party may require.7  In one State, these principles
have been carried so far, that where an assignment of an unnego-
tiable note, secured by mortgage, was made, it was held that this
transferred the interest in the mortgage to the assignee, so as to
entitle him to maintain a writ of entry in his own name thereupon,
although he could not sue upon the debt itself except in'the name
Scott vs. 3lcFarland, 13 Mass. 309. 2 New London vs. Sutton, 2 N. IT. 401.
Smith vs. Manuing, 9 Mass. 422.
4 Coles vs. Cules, 15 Johns. 319; Collins vs. Torrey, 6 Pick. 416; Gibson vs.
Crehore, 15 Mass. 278. 1 Cutler vs. Haven, 8 Pick. 490.
6 Roberts on Frauds, 275; Jackson vs. Blodgett, 5 Conn. 202; Green vs. Hart,
1 Johns. 580.
7 Starr vs. Ellis, 6 Johns. C. R. 305; Robinson vs. Leavitt, 7 N. H. 100.
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of the assignor, and therefore in a real action brought in the name
of the assignor, upon the mortgage, for the benefit of the assignee,
judgment was given for the defendant, because of the improper
plaintiff.' And further, the interest in the mortgage is not within
the statute of frauds, as it is only a mere incident to the debt and
inseparable from it; and in many States, upon payment or tender
of payment of the mortgage money, whether before or after con-
dition broken, the mortgagee's title is extinguished, and the unin-
cumbered interest in the land re-vests in the mortgagor, by mere
operation of law, without a reconveyance or discharge of any kind.
2
But, although the principle that a mortgage is only a security
for the debt specified in its condition, has been so fully adopted, and
although a mortgage is, in general, "now viewed in a court of law
in the same light as in a court of equity," nevertheless, a mortgage
is a security of a peculiar nature, and must be distinguished from
all other securities. It is executed with all the formalities neces-
sary to a conveyance of real estate, in order that the mortgagee, if
he desires, may make it operate as a transfer of the title to the land,
and place himself in possession of the estate. It is a "potential
conveyance " of the legal title, and whenever the mortgagee sees fit
to exercise his rights under the conveyance, he may enter upon the
land, and will be considered as seized for all purposes necessary to
the maintenance of his legal rights. 3  When thus properly entered
he can remain, taking the rents and profits of the land, until the
mortgage debt is paid. Upon a redemption, however, he is liable
to account for the rents and profits received during his possession,
and he cannot foreclose and obtain the absolute title, although in
actual possession, without giving express notice to the mortgagor
that he holds for that purpose.
Such is a brief statement of the effect of a mortgage, and the
relations of the parties to such instruments as generally established
Rigney vs. Lovejoy, 13 N. Hamp. Reps. 253.
Porter vs. Millett, 9 Mass. 101 ; Jackson vs. Stackhouse, 1 Conn. 122 ; Sweet
vs. Horn, 3 Mason, 520.
3 Rigney vs. Lovejoy, 13 N. H. 253.
